

UNITED STATES PATENT APPLICATION

of

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for

**SYSTEMS AND METHODS FOR
DETECTING TAMPERING OF A COMPUTER SYSTEM
BY CALCULATING A BOOT SIGNATURE**

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BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

1. The Field of the Invention

The present invention relates to the field of electronic communication. In particular, the present invention relates to systems and methods for detecting tampering of a computer system by calculating a boot signature, the boot signature being calculated using a sequence of signals generated during boot time within the computer system.

2. The Prior State of the Art

Electronic information is currently available in a variety of forms. Electronic information that is designed for presentation to a user will typically be in a form such that it may be rendered on a user interface device. For example, electronic information such as video, image, text, font and layout data may be displayed on a monitor thereby engaging a user's sense of sight. Electronic information such as audio may be sounded with a speaker thereby engaging a user's sense of hearing. In the future, with the development of appropriate user interface devices and standards, electronic information may represent data that would engage a user's sense of touch, taste, and smell as well. Electronic information that is designed for presentation to a user will be referred to in this description and in the claims as "presentable content" regardless of the format of the presentable content and regardless of whether standards and user interface devices for the presentable content are currently developed.

There may be many sources of presentable content. Remote sources might include, for example, radio broadcasters, television broadcasters, and server computer systems. Local source might include, for example, a local memory or a local server computer system. These sources will be referred to in this description and in the claims as "content

1 sources" regardless of the particular source of the presentable content and regardless of
2 whether the source is remote or local.

3 It may often be desirable to limit access to presentable content. For example, a
4 television broadcaster may design that access to their channel be limited to only those
5 users who have properly subscribed to that channel. A television broadcaster may also
6 allow access on a program-by-program basis as in pay-per-view television. A content
7 source such as a Web page provider may also desire to limit access to premium Web pages
8 upon the payment of certain consideration. In these cases, the content source may
9 typically encrypt the presentable content before transmission to the user. A content source
10 such as a broadcast network or even a local memory device may store the presentable
11 content in an already encrypted state thereby foregoing the need to encrypt the content
12 again.

13 In order for an authorized user to be able to access encrypted presentable content on
14 a user interface device, the corresponding system associated with the user interface device
15 must have access to a service that determines that the user is authorized, and that decrypts
16 the encrypted presentable content when it determines that the user is authorized. A set top
17 box or a component integrated with a television monitor may be suitable devices for
18 performing such a service for encrypted television programming. Devices that perform
19 this service will be referred to in this description and in the claims as a "conditional access
20 device."

21 Conventional conditional access devices typically include a decrypter that has
22 access to encrypted presentable content requested by a user. For example, in television
23 broadcasting, a user may control a tuner which tunes to one of the many channels that the
24

1 conditional access device receives. The tuned channel is then demodulated and presented
2 to the decrypter.

3 The decrypter is designed to respond to an appropriate key word or other
4 authenticating string. Typically, unless provided with the key word, decrypters will either
5 not pass any signal through to the user interface devices or will pass only the encrypted
6 content through to the user interface devices. In either case, the user does not have access
7 to the presentable content. However, once the appropriate key word is provided to the
8 decrypter, the decrypter is activated so as to decrypt the encrypted presentable content and
9 pass the presentable content to the user interface devices for presentation to the user. The
10 decrypter is active indefinitely or until the happening of a certain event. Such events may
11 include the receipt of another key word that deactivates the decrypter, the end of a certain
12 presentable content segment, or the passage of a specified period of time.

13 There are a variety of ways that the key word can be provided to the decrypter
14 when the user is authorized. For example, in the Digital Video Broadcast (DVB) standard,
15 an Entitlement Control Message (ECM) is provided "in band" within the digital video
16 broadcast. "In band" means in the same channel or frequency spectrum as the
17 corresponding presentable content. The entitlement control message is processed by the
18 local Central Processing Unit (CPU). If the entitlement control message indicates
19 authority to access the digital video broadcast, the CPU causes a control word to be sent to
20 the decrypter. This control word may be the key word that activates the decrypter or may
21 be a word that enables the decrypter to load the key word from memory.

22 It may be possible to tamper with the content of local memory in order to obtain
23 access to a presentable content segment even though the user is not so authorized.
24 Typically, this might involve altering the operating system so that the key word is always

1 provided to the decrypter even if the user is not authorized. This frustrates the purpose for
2 providing a conditional access provider and allows access to presentable content under
3 inappropriate circumstances. Therefore, what are desired are systems and methods for
4 preventing users from tampering with computer systems so as to, for example, gain
5 unauthorized access to presentable content.

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SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

The present invention relates to systems and methods for detecting tampering of a computer system by using boot signatures. A "boot signature" is a signal sequence and/or data structure that represents a value that is a function of the signal sequence detected internal to the computer system, during booting up of the computer system. For example, the signal sequence might be the series of states of the signal that comprise the bus that connects the system's processing device with the system's memory device. If the content of the memory device is altered, then the signal sequence detected on the bus will change. This will result in the production of a different boot signature than what would be expected if the computer system was not tampered with. Thus, the computer system can determine whether the computer system has been tampered with as when one is trying to gain unauthorized access to presentable content.

The present invention may be integrated within a conditional access device that conditions access to certain presentable content such as television and Internet programming upon the satisfaction of certain conditions such as subscribing to the presentable content. A suitable conditional access provider that may implement the present invention may include a processing device and a memory device with a bus connecting the processing device and the memory device. A decrypter receives presentable content and decrypts the presentable content depending on whether the user has rights to the presentable content. If the user has rights, then the decrypter is typically provided with a key word or string that activates the decrypter so that the decrypter is permitted to decrypt presentable content.

It may be possible to alter the memory within the memory device so as to be able to gain access to presentable content even if the user is unauthorized. This might be done by

1 making changes to the operating system so that the activation key word is always provided
2 to the decrypter regardless of whether or not the user is authorized.

3 Unauthorized changing of the operating system within the memory device often
4 results in the signal sequence on the bus changing from what might be expected if the
5 operating system was not manipulated so as to allow unauthorized access. A boot
6 signature checker is coupled to the local bus so as to be able to monitor the signal sequence
7 on the bus during booting of the conditional access device. The boot signature checker
8 then produces a boot signature that is a function of the signal sequence detected during
9 boot time. The expected boot signature produced would be that produced when the signal
10 sequence during boot time is normal indicating no tampering of the operating system to
11 gain unauthorized access. If the actual boot signature is different than the expected boot
12 signature, then the decrypter or other elements of the conditional access device are disabled
13 so as to prevent the user does not gain unauthorized access to at least the tuned presentable
14 content. In addition, the conditional access device might disable a network interface
15 device such as a network interface device for a DOCSYS cable modem or a DSL
16 connection device. The conditional access device may also disable a phone line ADSL
17 modem, an analog modem and so forth.

18 If the actual boot signature is the expected boot signature, then there is no
19 indication that the operating system has not been tampered with. Thus, the correct boot
20 signature results in the key word being provided to the decrypter assuming all other
21 conditions for access are satisfied.

22 An advantage of the present invention is that it makes it much more difficult for an
23 unauthorized user to gain access to presentable content by tampering with the operating
24 system since such tampering would result in the boot signature being different than

1 expected. Thus, content sources can be more secure in providing presentable content to
2 users.

3 Additional features and advantages of the invention will be set forth in the
4 description which follows, and in part will be obvious from the description, or may be
5 learned by the practice of the invention. The features and advantages of the invention may
6 be realized and obtained by means of the instruments and combinations particularly
7 pointed out in the appended claims. These and other features of the present invention will
8 become more fully apparent from the following description and appended claims, or may
9 be learned by the practice of the invention as set forth hereinafter.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

In order that the manner in which the above-recited and other advantages and features of the invention are obtained, a more particular description of the invention briefly described above will be rendered by reference to specific embodiments thereof which are illustrated in the appended drawings. Understanding that these drawings depict only typical embodiments of the invention and are not therefore to be considered to be limiting of its scope, the invention will be described and explained with additional specificity and detail through the use of the accompanying drawings in which:

Figure 1 illustrates an exemplary system that provides a suitable operating environment for the present invention;

Figure 2 illustrates a computer system such as a conditional access device implemented in the environment illustrated in Figure 1 in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention; and

Figure 3 illustrates a flowchart of a method implemented by the computer system of Figure 2 for detecting tampering of the computer system of Figure 2 and acting upon such tampering so as to at least prevent the user from gaining unauthorized access to presentable content.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

The present invention extends to both systems and methods for detecting tampering to a computer system by calculating boot signatures. The "boot signature" is a function of a signal sequence detected internal to the computer system during booting up of the computer system. For example, the signal sequence may be detected on the bus that connects the computer system's processing device with the computer system's memory device. If the memory device content, specifically the operating system stored on the memory device, or any other part of the computer system is altered so as to allow unauthorized access to presentable content, then the detected signal sequence will change. This will result in the calculation of a different boot signature than what would be expected if the computer system was not altered. Thus, the computer system can determine that the computer system has been tampered with to allow unauthorized access. Upon such detection, the computer system may take certain action to prevent such unauthorized access. For example, the computer system might disable any of the components of the computer system that, when disabled, prevents presentation of the presentable content. Such components might include, for example, a demodulator, a decrypter, a network interface device, a tuner, a CPU clock and the like.

The embodiments of the present invention may comprise a special purpose or general purpose computer including various computer hardware, as discussed in greater detail below. Embodiments within the scope of the present invention also include computer-readable media for carrying or having computer-executable instructions or data structures stored thereon. Such computer-readable media can be any available media which can be accessed by a general purpose or special purpose computer. By way of example, and not limitation, such computer-readable media can comprise RAM, ROM,

1 EEPROM, CD-ROM or other optical disk storage, magnetic disk storage or other magnetic
2 storage devices, or any other medium which can be used to carry or store desired program
3 code means in the form of computer-executable instructions or data structures and which
4 can be accessed by a general purpose or special purpose computer. When information is
5 transferred or provided over a network or another communications connection (either
6 hardwired, wireless, or a combination of hardwired or wireless) to a computer, the
7 computer properly views the connection as a computer-readable medium. Thus, any such
8 connection is properly termed a computer-readable medium. Combinations of the above
9 should also be included within the scope of computer-readable media. Computer-
10 executable instructions comprise, for example, instructions and data which cause a general
11 purpose computer, special purpose computer, or special purpose processing device to
12 perform a certain function or group of functions.

13 Figure 1 and the following discussion are intended to provide a brief, general
14 description of a suitable environment in which the invention may be implemented. Those
15 skilled in the art will appreciate that the invention may be practiced in network computing
16 environments with many types of computer system configurations, including personal
17 computers, hand-held devices, multi-processor systems, microprocessor-based or
18 programmable consumer electronics, network PCs, minicomputers, mainframe computers,
19 and the like. The invention may also be practiced in distributed computing environments
20 where tasks are performed by local and remote processing devices that are linked (either by
21 hardwired links, wireless links, or by a combination of hardwired or wireless links)
22 through a communications network. In a distributed computing environment, program
23 modules may be located in both local and remote memory storage devices.

1 Figure 1 illustrates a suitable operating environment 100 for the present invention.
2 A content source 110 provides presentable content 120 to a receiver computer system 130
3 over a communication medium 140. The content source 110 may be any provider of
4 presentable content including, but not limited to, a radio broadcaster, a television
5 broadcaster, a remote server, a local server, or a local memory. The presentable content
6 120 may include, but is not limited to, radio broadcasting, television broadcasting, Web
7 pages, stored video, stored audio, other stored data, and so forth. The communication
8 medium 140 may be terrestrial airwaves, cable, satellite, the Internet, a local network, a
9 local bus or any other medium capable of transporting presentable content to the
10 conditional access device 130.

11 The operating environment 100 also includes a secured channel 150 for
12 transmitting new boot signatures 160 to the receiver computer system 130. As will be
13 explained in greater detail below, these new boot signatures 160 are transmitted to the
14 receiver computer system when software in the receiver computer system is upgraded.

15 In a specific embodiment in which the content source 110 is a digital television
16 source such as a digital television broadcaster, the content source 110 passes the
17 presentable content 170 through an encrypter 180. The encrypted presentable content 120
18 is then transmitted to the receiver computer system along with Entitlement Control
19 Messages ("ECMs") 190 which describe access privileges to the encrypted presentable
20 content.

21 Figure 2 illustrates the receiver computer system 130 of Figure 1 in further detail.
22 In this particular example, the presentable content 120 received at the receiver computer
23 system 130 will be described as being an encrypted digital television broadcast. However,
24 the present invention is not limited to just encrypted digital television broadcasts but is

1 broad enough to include all types of presentable content whether now existing or to be
2 developed in the future and whether encrypted or not.

3 The receiver computer system 130 includes a processing device 202 and a memory
4 device 204 that are communicatively coupled through a bus 206 and through a memory
5 controller 208. The processing device 202 may be a central processing unit such as those
6 commonly available in the marketplace. The processing device 202 processes computer-
7 executable instructions so as to facilitate the methods described herein.

8 The memory device 204 may be any memory device such as a Random Access
9 Memory (RAM), a Read-Only Memory (ROM), or an EEPROM. The memory device 204
10 stores at least some of the computer-executable instructions and data needed for the
11 processing device 202 to start up or "boot" the receiving computer system 130 upon
12 powering up of the receiver computer system. The memory device 204 may also
13 optionally include other instructions and data as well.

14 The memory controller 208 interfaces with the memory device 204 and monitors
15 the bus 206 for instructions that the memory controller 208 is to execute on the memory
16 device 204. For example, the memory controller 208 may receive an instruction to read
17 from a certain address in the memory device 204 and place the content of that address on
18 the bus 206. The memory controller 208 may also receive an instruction to write certain
19 content into a certain address in the memory device 204. The bus 206 may be any
20 communications connection that allows the processing device 202 and the memory
21 controller 208 to communicate.

22 The bus 206 is also coupled to various components in signal processing circuitry
23 230 so that the processing device 202 may control the signal processing circuitry 230. The
24 signal processing circuitry 230 includes a demodulator 212 that is coupled to a tuner 210

1 so as to be able to demodulate any channel tuned by the tuner 210. The demodulator 212
2 may be configured to demodulate everything tuned by the tuner 210, or may be configured
3 to demodulate only some of the channels tuned by the tuner 210 as instructed by the
4 processing device 202 over the bus 206.

5 A decrypter 214 is coupled to the demodulator 212 so as to receive the
6 demodulated signal from the demodulator 212. The decrypter 214 selectively decrypts
7 encrypted signals and forwards the decrypted signal to a transport stream demultiplexor
8 216. Under normal operating conditions in which no tampering of the receiver computer
9 system 130 has occurred, the entitlement control messages 190 would typically drive
10 whether or not the decrypter 214 would decrypt the encrypted signals.

11 The demultiplexor 216 then extracts video data from the decrypted signal and
12 forwards that video data to a video decoder 218. The demultiplexor 216 also extracts
13 audio data from the decrypted signal and forwards that audio data to an audio decoder 220.
14 The video decoder 218 drives a monitor 222 so that the monitor 222 displays the video
15 represented by the video data. Likewise, the audio decoder 220 drives a speaker 224 so
16 that the speaker 224 sounds the audio represented by the audio data. All of the signal
17 processing circuitry 230 such as the demodulator 212, the decrypter 214, the demultiplexor
18 216, the video decoder 218 and the audio decoder 220 are coupled to the processing device
19 202 through the bus 206.

20 As mentioned above, the present invention determines whether the receiving
21 computer system 130 has been tampered with by using boot signatures. A "boot signature"
22 is a signal sequence or a data structure that is a function of the signal sequence detected
23 internal to the receiving computer system 130 during booting up of the receiving computer
24 system 130. The signal sequence should be monitored at a point in the receiving computer

1 system 130 at which there would be a change in the signal sequence if tampering occurred.
2 For example, in Figure 2, tampering of the operating system within the memory device 204
3 would typically cause the signal sequence provided on the bus 206 to be different than
4 expected.

5 If the signal sequence is altered from that which is expected, the memory device
6 204 might have been altered or swapped out to obtain access to unauthorized presentable
7 content. If the signal sequence is altered, the boot signature will also be different than what
8 is expected. This may result in action being taken that is responsive to the receiving
9 computer system 130 being tampered with. Such action might include, for example,
10 disabling the presentation of the presentable content.

11 Therefore, embodiments within the scope of the present invention include a means
12 for calculating a boot signature that is a function of a signal sequence experienced internal
13 to the computer system during booting up of the receiving computer system 130. In Figure
14 1, an example of this means for producing a boot signature is illustrated by boot signature
15 checker 226.

16 The boot signature checker 226 may comprise one or more physical components or
17 may be integrated in another physical component. In the preferred embodiment, the boot
18 signature checker 226 is integrated within the same physical component as the decrypter
19 214 so as to improve the security of the authentication mechanism.

20 The boot signature checker 226 is coupled to a bus 206 so as to be able to monitor the
21 signal sequence experienced on the bus 206 during boot time. The boot signature checker
22 226 is configured to provide a calculated boot signature 232 to the decrypter that is a
23 function of the detected signal sequence on the bus 206. The boot signature checker 226 is
24 configured to calculate this boot signature such that if the boot signal sequence is different

1 than expected, the resulting calculated boot signature will most likely be different than
2 expected as well.

3 There are numerous conventional algorithms for calculating such a boot signature.
4 Any algorithm which creates substantially unique keys given multiple inputs will suffice.
5 The inputs to the algorithm would be sampled signal values detected on the bus. The
6 characteristics of the algorithm should be such that any change to the content of the
7 memory device 204 results in a new boot signature. Such boot signatures can be created
8 using higher order polynomial algorithms with the sampled signal values being inputs to
9 the algorithm. The higher order polynomial expressions may also use an identifier unique
10 to the receiver computer system 130 as a seed input to further improve the security of the
11 receiver computer system. The receiver computer system 130 uses the calculated boot
12 signature to determine whether or not the receiver computer system 130 has been tampered
13 with. Accordingly, embodiments within the scope of the present invention include means
14 for determining whether the calculated boot signature is indicative of the receiver computer
15 system being tampered with. Specifically, the boot signature checker 226 has access to an
16 expected boot signature 234 that represents what the calculated boot signature should be if
17 the receiver computer system 130 has not been tampered with. The boot signature checker
18 226 then compares the calculated boot signature with the expected boot signature to
19 determine whether or not tampering has occurred.

20 Figure 3 illustrates a flowchart of a method 300 of detecting whether tampering of
21 the receiver computer system 130 has occurred and then acting upon such tampering so as
22 to at least prevent the user from gaining access to presentable content. The method 300
23 will be described with frequent reference to both Figure 2 and Figure 3.

1 The method 300 is initiated in response to the booting up of the receiver computer
2 system (step 310). Typically, the booting up might occur in response to the powering up
3 or resetting of the receiver computer system 130. The method 300 then performs a step for
4 calculating a boot signature that is a function of a signal sequence experienced internal to
5 the computer system during booting of the computer system (step 320).

6 The signal sequence may occur at any location internal to the receiver computer
7 system 130 so long as the signal sequence would change if the receiver computer system
8 130 had been tampered with. In the example of Figure 2 in which the receiver computer
9 system 130 includes a bus 206 connecting the processing device 202 and the memory
10 device 204, the step for calculating a boot signature is performed by the boot signature
11 checker 226 first monitoring the bus 206 between the processing device 202 and the
12 memory device 204 (step 330) to determine the signal sequences experienced on the bus
13 206. Next, the boot signature checker 226 determines the signal sequence that occurs on
14 the bus 206 during the boot process (step 340). Finally, the boot signature checker 226
15 calculates the boot signature (step 350), the calculated boot signature being such that
16 different detected signal sequences will in all probability cause a distinctly different
17 calculated boot signature.

18 Once, the boot signature is calculated, the method 300 performs a step for
19 determining whether the calculated boot signature is indicative of the receiver computer
20 system 130 being tampered with. In the example of Figure 3, this determination is made
21 by comparing the calculated boot signature with the expected boot signature. Once this
22 determination is made, the method performs a step for acting on the determination of
23 whether the calculated boot signature is indicative of the receiver computer system having
24 been tampered with.

1 For example, if the boot signature is the expected boot signature ("YES" in
2 decision block 360), then the signal sequence is characteristic of the memory device 204
3 not having been tampered with. In this case, appropriate action is taken that is consistent
4 with the receiver computer system not having been tampered with. Such action might
5 include, for example, activating a decrypter (step 370). "Activating" a decrypter means
6 that the decrypter will decrypt received content so long as the decrypter has received all
7 other permissions necessary to decrypt. For example, an "activated" decrypter will decrypt
8 content if the associated Entitlement Control Message (ECM) indicates permission to
9 access the content. However, an "activated" decrypter will not decrypt content if the
10 associated ECM indicates that permission to access is denied.

11 If the calculated boot signature is not the expected boot signature ("NO" in decision
12 block 360), then the signal sequence is characteristic of the memory device 204 having
13 been tamper with so as to, for example, obtain unauthorized access to presentable content.
14 In this case, appropriate action is taken that is consistent with the receiver computer system
15 having been tampered with. For example, the decrypter might be deactivated (step 380) so
16 that the presentable content may not be presented to the unauthorized user. A
17 "deactivated" decrypter means that the decrypter does not decrypt any content at all
18 whether or not the associated ECM grants permission to access. Other action might
19 include, for example, disabling the demodulator so that received presentable content is not
20 demodulated, disabling the tuner so that the presentable content cannot be tuned, disabling
21 the demodulator so that audio and video data cannot be extracted, disabling a CPU clock,
22 disabling a network interface device and so forth. Thus, appropriate action could include
23 disabling some or all of the functionality of the receiver computer system 130.
24

1 In a situation where the decrypter is to be enabled only if the calculated boot
2 signature matches the expected boot signature, the step for acting on the determination
3 might include the boot signature checker 226 transmitting the calculated boot signature
4 232 to the decrypter 214. This transmission may occur over the bus 206. However, in
5 Figure 1, the boot signature 232 is provided over a dedicated connection 228 with the
6 decrypter 214. If the boot signature checker 226 and the decrypter are within the same
7 physical component, the dedicated connection 228 may also be within the same physical
8 component making it difficult, if not impossible, for an outside user to monitor the
9 dedicated connection 228.

10 The calculated boot signature 232 itself may be the key string needed to activate the
11 decrypter 214. However, the calculated boot signature 232 may also be used to obtain
12 access to the appropriate activation key word. For example, the decrypter 214 may be
13 configured to access memory such as the memory device 204 to obtain the key string when
14 the decrypter receives the correct boot signature 232. Then, the accessed key string
15 activates the decrypter. Other components may also be used to obtain access to the key
16 word in response to the boot signature checker 226 providing the correct boot signature.

17 The above-described system and method effectively prevents users from tampering
18 with the receiving computer system as when altering the content of the memory device 204
19 or swapping out the memory device 204 in order to obtain unauthorized access to
20 presentable content since such altering of the memory device 204 content would cause the
21 signal sequence on the bus at boot time to change.

22 There may be times, however, when the software stored in the memory device 204
23 may need to be changed in order to upgrade the software. These upgrades may also affect
24 the signal sequence on the bus 206 during boot time. In these cases, a new expected boot

signature is provided to the receiver computer system 130 that matches the boot signal sequence that would be generated with the new updated software installed on the receiver computer system 130. This new boot signature may be provided with the software upgrade or may be accessed from a remote source as needed.

In the example of Figure 1, new boot signatures are provided over a secured channel 130. The secured channel may be "secured" by being a separate dedicated physical connection, or may be "secured" by using a secured communication protocol. As shown in Figure 2, the new boot signature corresponding to the newly installed software is transmitted to the boot signature checker 226. The boot signature checker then replaces the expected boot signature 234 with the new expected boot signature. During the next booting operation, an untampered computer system 130 would result in the new expected boot signature being calculated based on the detected boot signal sequence. In Figure 2, the receiving computer system 130 may be coupled to the secured channel using a network interface device 236.

The above describes a system and method for detecting tampering of a computer system by using a boot signature. The present invention may be embodied in other specific forms without departing from its spirit or essential characteristics. The described embodiments are to be considered in all respects only as illustrative and not restrictive. The scope of the invention is, therefore, indicated by the appended claims rather than by the foregoing description. All changes which come within the meaning and range of equivalency of the claims are to be embraced within their scope.

What is claimed and desired to be secured by United States Letters Patent is: